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Fixed transaction costs and delivery lags are important costs of international trade. These costs lead
firms to import infrequently and hold substantially larger inventories of imported goods than domestic
goods. Using multiple sources of data, we document these facts. We then show that a parsimoniously
parameterized model economy with importers facing an (S, s)-type inventory management problem
successfully accounts for these features of the data. Moreover, the model can account for import and
import price dynamics in the aftermath of large devaluations. In particular, desired inventory adjustment
in response to a sudden, large increase in the relative price of imported goods creates a short-term
trade implosion, an immediate, temporary drop in the value and number of distinct varieties imported,
as well as a slow increase in the retail price of imported goods. Our study of 6 current account reversals
following large devaluation episodes in the last decade provide strong support for the model's predictions.
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The costs of international trade are large, especially in developing countries.1 Given its
simplicity, iceberg depreciation has been the usual approach to modelling these costs, but un-
derstanding trade ﬂows requires a deeper understanding of the nature of frictions involved in
international trade. The particular microstructure of trade frictions has implications for whether
and which trade costs are policy-mutable, how trade patterns and trade costs change over time,
and what the gains to trade are (e.g., Ruhl, 2005, Chaney, 2007, Alessandria and Choi, 2007b).
This paper documents two important frictions faced by ﬁrms participating in international trade;
models their eﬀect on inventory management; and quantitatively evaluates the role they play
in accounting for the behavior of prices and trade ﬂows in episodes of large current account
reversals.
The two micro-frictions we highlight are time lags between the order and delivery of goods and
ﬁxed costs of transacting. These frictions manifest themselves as trade costs not only directly
(the time cost/depreciation of lags and the cost of transacting), but also indirectly since they
lead ﬁrms facing uncertain demand to carry larger, costlier inventories.
There is substantial direct evidence of non-trivial time lags between the order and delivery
of goods in international trade, as documented forcefully by Hummels (2001). For instance,
delivery times from Europe to the US Midwest are 2-3 weeks, those to the Middle East as
much as 6 weeks. Given demand uncertainty and depreciation of goods, these lags are non-
trivial. Hummels estimates that an additional 30-day lag between orders and delivery acts
as a 12 to 24 percent ad-valorem tax on a shipment’s value. Longer distances are not the
only factor contributing to the longer delays in transactions associated with trading goods
across borders. Man-made bureaucratic barriers slow the ﬂow of goods across borders. A
recent survey by the World Bank2 ﬁnds that it takes an average of 12 days (OECD) to 37 days
(Europe and Central Asia) for importers to assemble import licences, customs declaration forms,
bills of lading, commercial invoices, technical and health certiﬁcates, tax certiﬁcates and other
1Anderson and van Wincoop (2002) provide an excellent review of the evidence.
2Trading Across Borders. Available at http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreTopics/TradingAcrossBorders/
1certiﬁcates required to engage in international transactions.3
Many bureaucratic procedures are transaction costs that are independent of a shipment’s
size, and indeed the ﬁxed component of the overall cost of international transactions is also
non-trivial. According to the World Bank report mentioned above, part of the cost of importing
a container into, say, Argentina, includes the cost of documents preparation ($750), customs
clearing and technical control ($150), as well as the cost of ports and terminal handling ($600).
We document in this paper that these, and other ﬁxed costs of international trade, amount to
3 to 11 percent of a shipment’s value. Given that most goods transacted across borders are
storable, these ﬁxed costs make it optimal for importers to engage in international transactions
infrequently and hold substantial inventories of imported goods.
Indeed, we provide direct evidence that participants in international trade face more severe
inventory management problems. First, using a large panel of Chilean manufacturing plants,
we ﬁnd that importing ﬁrms have inventory ratios that are roughly twice those of ﬁrms that
only purchase raw materials domestically. Second, we show that inventory behavior is diﬀerent
for imported and domestic materials even within the same ﬁrm. Using detailed data on the
purchasing history of a US steel manufacturer from Hall and Rust (2000, 2002, 2003), we
document that the typical international order tends to be about 50 percent larger and half
as frequent as the typical domestic order.
We ﬁnally document that trade ﬂows, at the micro-economic level, are lumpy and infrequent.
This is again evidence of the frictions and inventory problems we highlight. Using monthly data
o nt h eu n i v e r s eo fa l lU Se x p o r t sf o rg o o d si nn a r r o w l yd e ﬁned categories (10-digit Harmonized
System code) against its trading partners, we show that the average “good” is characterized by
positive trade ﬂows in only one-half of the months during a year, a statistic that overstates the
frequency of trade at the good level given that more than one good is typically included in an
3In related work, delivery lags and the demand for timeliness have been shown to have important implications
for gravity equation trade ﬂows (Djankov et al., 2007), location/sourcing decisions (Evans and Harrigan, 2005)
and provide a structural interpretation of distributed lags in import demand equations (Kollintzas and Husted,
1984). Delivery lags have also been studied in business cycle models by Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1994) and
Mazzenga and Ravn (2004).
2HS-10 category. Moreover, annual trade is highly concentrated in a few months. The bulk of
trade (85 percent) is accounted for by only three months of the year; the top month of the year
accounts for 50 percent of that year’s trade on average. The infrequency, randomness, and high
concentration of these trade ﬂows in a few months of the year reﬂect the importance of ﬁxed
transaction costs, uncertainty, and inventory concerns in international trade.
A natural question is whether micro-level lumpiness and micro-trade frictions are quantita-
tively important for aggregate behavior, and the answer is yes. These frictions and the inven-
tories they lead to have important impacts on short-run responses of trade ﬂows and pricing
to economic shocks.4 We focus on large, unanticipated terms of trade shocks associated with
the large devaluations experienced in recent years by developing economies. These are large,
easily identiﬁable shocks that are economically important and exhibit a number of common
trade-related patterns. Thus, they are ideal candidates for studying the role of the frictions we
emphasize.
Figure 1 summarizes three salient features of these devaluation episodes that we address.
First, as documented by Burstein, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2005), following the currency de-
preciation there is a gradual and smaller increase in the price of imported goods at the retail
level, despite the larger and more immediate increase in the at-the-dock (wholesale) price of
imported goods, as measured by the import price index. Second, imports collapse while exports
rise only gradually with the decline in imports quite large relative to the change in relative
prices, particularly in the short run.5 Third, the number of goods imported (the extensive mar-
gin, here measured by distinct HS-10 codes from the US) contracts and recovers only gradually.
These features of devaluations are inconsistent with models with iceberg trade costs, as the
change in trade is governed solely by the change in relative prices: relatively small short-run
price responses should result in relatively small trade responses.
4The role of non-convexities of inventory adjustment over the business cycle has been studied in partial (Caplin
1985, Caballero and Engel 1991) and general equilibrium environments (Fisher and Hornstein 2000, Khan and
Thomas 2007a). Unlike these papers, which focus on relatively small shocks in a closed economy, our emphasis
is on large aggregate shocks in an open economy.
5In these developing countries the relatively large, short-run trade response is the opposite of the small,
short-run J-curve type trade response (Magee 1973) observed in more industrialized countries.
3We argue in this paper that these three features of emerging market devaluations are an
outcome of the inventory-management problem faced by ﬁrms participating in international
transactions, a problem that becomes even more severe during times of large, unanticipated
shocks. To this end, we formulate and calibrate an industry model of importers that face lags
between orders and delivery, uncertain demand, ﬁxed costs of importing, and irreversibility. We
show that the parsimoniously parameterized model economy can well account for the range of
micro-economic facts we document. We then show that the model predicts that in response
to an unanticipated devaluation, associated with an increase in the wholesale price of imports,
i) importers reduce retail markups, thereby incompletely passing through the wholesale price
increase to consumers, ii) imports collapse and they do so in large part because of a iii) large
drop in extensive margin: the number of varieties imported.
In the model, the quantitatively important aspect of a devaluation is the large increase in the
relative (wholesale) price of imported to domestically produced goods.6 Given the higher post-
devaluation market price of imports, the importer’s original holdings of inventories are higher
than optimally desired. As a result, the fraction of importers (the extensive margin) drops
immediately following the devaluation. The fall in the extensive margin, as well as smaller
desired inventories from those who do import (the intensive margin), compounds the eﬀect of
the relative price change on a country’s import values, causing a short-lived trade implosion.
The response of prices in the model is also novel. The inventory frictions we emphasize make
it optimal for the ﬁrm’s retail price to decrease with its current inventory holdings. Higher
inventories reduce the shadow valuation of an additional unit of inventories because they 1)
lower the probability of a stockout, 2) postpone the payment of the ﬁx e dc o s t ,a n d3 )i n c r e a s e
the likelihood that the current inventory stock will be carried over into the next period, thereby
increasing the inventory carrying costs. As a result, the higher than optimally desired inventory
holdings immediately after the devaluation make it optimal for importers to keep prices low until
they gradually work oﬀ their relatively high level of inventories and return to the import market.
6Changes in interest rates and consumption have a smaller, secondary role.
4Inventory adjustment frictions break the tight link between the replacement cost (wholesale
price), which increases immediately upon impact, and the shadow value of the goods in inventory
which increases only gradually.
Our model thus suggests that the sharp drop in import values and the extensive margin
of trade that characterize the recent devaluation episodes is invariably linked to the failure of
retail prices to respond to the large increase in the (at-the-dock) wholesale price of imports
documented by Burstein, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2005). The trade frictions we emphasize
thus provide a new channel for the observed slow adjustment of retail prices to changes in
international relative prices, a pervasive empirical regularity in the literature.7 In contrast to
explanations that emphasize price adjustment frictions (which break the link between desired
and actual markups), or local costs8 (which argue that an important component of the marginal
cost of selling a good to the consumer is unaﬀected by the terms-of-trade shock), we emphasize
quantity adjustment frictions that break the link between a good’s replacement cost and its
marginal valuation.9 We view our mechanism as complementary to these alternative ones.
This paper is related to two other lines of research. First, a number of papers attribute
an important role to ﬁxed costs in accounting for the pattern of trade. This literature largely
focuses on the large, ﬁxed costs that ﬁrms incur in starting or continuing to export (see, for
example Baldwin, 1988, Roberts and Tybout, 1997, Melitz, 2003, and Das, Roberts and Tybout,
2007).10 These ﬁxed costs are important in explaining export participation by plants as well
as the dynamics of trade over the business cycle (Ghironi and Melitz, 2006, and Alessandria
and Choi, 2007a) or following trade reforms (Ruhl, 2005). In an inﬂu e n t i a lp a p e r ,B a l d w i na n d
Krugman (1989) show that ﬁxed costs are central to explaining the gradual current account
reversal following the large depreciation of the dollar in the mid-1980s. A key ﬁnding in this
7Goldberg and Knetter (1997) provide a thorough summary of exchange rate pass-through.
8See for instance Corsetti and Dedola (2003) and Campa and Goldberg, 2006.
9In related work, Goldberg and Hellerstein (2007) use a structural model of the retail and wholesale beer
i n d u s t r yt od e c o m p o s ei n c o m p l e t ee x c h a n g er a t ep a s s - t h r o ugh into non-traded costs, price adjustment frictions
and markup adjustments. Our mechanism for markup adjustment, which is complementary to theirs, has poten-
tial implications for such micro-level studies of pass-through in that we stress an intimate link between import
quantities/shipments and prices at the micro-level.
10Eaton and Kortum (2005) also study the extensive margin of trade but in a framework without ﬁxed costs.
5literature is that, with costs of exporting, in the short run, trade responds less to shocks than in
t h el o n gr u n .T h et y p eo ft r a d ec o s t sw es t u d y ,ﬁxed ordering costs and delivery lags, combined
with the storability of goods, leads to the opposite result: short run trade responses are much
larger than long run responses. Second, our focus on business cycles in emerging markets is
similar to Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Aguiar and Gopinath (2007). However, unlike these
studies, which abstract from relative price movements, we focus on trade and relative price
dynamics in the aftermath of large devaluations.
2. Data
This section uses microdata to document several important and related facts of importing
behavior: (i) our transaction level frictions — delivery lags and ﬁxed costs, (ii) the relationship
between inventories (both ﬁnal goods and materials) and import content, and (iii) the lumpi-
ness of trade and domestic shipments. We focus primarily on data for developing countries in
documenting these facts, and address each fact in sequence.
A. Direct Evidence on Frictions
An important characteristic of international trade is the sizable ﬁxed costs of trade, both in
terms of time costs and monetary costs. Data on these costs are available from the World Bank’s
Doing Business database (World Bank, 2007)11. These costs are comprehensive of all costs
accrued between the contractual agreement and the delivery of goods, excluding international
shipping costs, tariﬀs ,a n di n l a n dt r a n s p o r t a t i o nc o s t s . 12 They include document preparation,
customs clearing/technical control, and port/terminal handling faced by both the exporting and
importing country.13
Table 1 summarizes the costs faced for diﬀerent countries. The ﬁrst column shows that time
11See Djankov et al. (2006) for a description of the survey methodology underlying these data.
12The costs are based on a standardized container of cargo of non-hazardous, non-military textiles, apparel, or
coﬀee/tea/spice between capital cities. We exclude inland transportation costs on both sides, since these costs
may not be speciﬁc to international trade.
13Common import documents include bills of lading, commercial invoices, cargo manifests, customs cargo
release forms, customs import declaration forms, packing lists, shipment arrival notices, and quality/health
inspection certiﬁcates. U.S. export documents consist of a bill of lading, certiﬁcate of origin, commercial invoice,
customs export declaration form, packing list, and pre-shipment inspection clean report of ﬁndings.
6costs are considerable. Importing time costs range from 11 (Korea) to 33 (Russia) days, but
roughly three weeks is the norm in the other countries.14 These costs exclude inland trans-
portation on both sides (typically two days in the US and two days in the destination country),
and shipping times are on the order of a couple of weeks for boats, which is the most common
shipping form in the US export data for all but Mexico. Thus, a typical shipment takes one to
two months from the time of order to receipt of goods.
The second and third columns show the importing and exporting costs respectively. These
costs are in US dollars for 2006, and we view most costs as predominantly ﬁxed costs per
transaction. Importing costs are roughly $500 for Mexico and Korea, $1,000 for Brazil, Russia,
and Thailand, and $1,500 for Argentina, while US export costs are an additional $625.15 The
median shipments in 2004 from the US export data are in the range of $10,900 (Mexico) to
$21,000 (Russia), while average shipments are much larger, ranging between $37,500 (Mexico)
to $89,000 (Korea). Based on these data, importing and exporting costs as a fraction of median
shipments range from 0.07 to 0.17, and 0.01 to 0.06 as a fraction of mean shipments.
These costs omit international shipping costs, which are also non-neglible. US import data
(the counterpart of the export data) contain freight charges for similar sized shipments. These
data indicate that freight costs between the US and these countries range from $500 (South
Korea) to $1000 (Argentina and Brazil), with Mexico being the one exception ($100) presumably
because of the prevalence of trucking and its proximity to the US. Freight costs contain a
substantial ﬁxed cost component, driven in part by containerized shipping technology that
greatly increases the per unit costs of shipping less than a full container.
B. Importer Inventory Management
We argue that the ﬁxed costs and time lags documented above lead to larger inventory ratios
and lumpier adjustment of imported goods relative to domestic goods. We document this using
t w om i c r od a t as e t s : o n em u l t i - p l a n td a t as e tf r o mad e v e l o p i n gc o u n t r y( C h i l e )t h a ta l l o w s
14Exporting time costs from the U.S. are roughly a week, but we exclude these since we assume that this is
concurrent with the import time costs in the destination country.
15Russian import costs omit port/terminal handling charges.
7us to see how inventory behavior varies with the importance of imported goods, and a more
detailed data set from a single ﬁrm (a US steel importer) that shows that inventory behavior
for imports and domestic purchases diﬀe r se v e nw i t h i nt h es a m eﬁrm.
Chilean plant-level evidence
The data set covers 7 years (1990 to 1996) and includes 7,234 unique manufacturing plants and
34,990 observations. The data is from the Chilean industrial survey conducted by the Chilean
National Statistics Institute and have been used elsewhere (see Hsieh and Parker, 2008). The
plant-level data are well suited for our purposes, since Chile is at a comparable level of economic
development to the countries that experienced devaluations, and so are likely to be similar to
data from plants in these countries.
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Table 2 reports some summary statistics from this panel of manufacturing plants for the
whole period for our three diﬀerent measures of inventory holdings.16 We report both simple
and annual sales-weighted averages. For the sake of brevity, we discuss only the sales-weighted
averages. On average, the typical manufacturing plant holds approximately 21.7 percent of its
annual purchases in inventories. Among non-importers, the typical plant holds 17.8 percent of
16Over the sample, about 24 percent of our plants imported in a particular year. Over time, the share of
importers in the sample increases by approximately ten percent.
8its annual purchases in inventories, while the typical importer holds 24.3 percent and imports
account for 29.9 percent of the value of annual materials inputs. When we split inventory
holdings into materials and ﬁnished goods, we see that importers hold more at both stages of
production.
From Table 2 it is clear that importers hold more inventories than non-importers. However,
we would like to know to what extent importers hold more inventories of their imported goods.
To get at this we need to control for the fact that importers don’t import all inputs. From the
following linear regression of inventory holdings on import content,
(1) ijt = c + α ∗ s
im
jt + ejt
we ﬁnd a strong positive relation between import content and inventory holdings. In a range
of speciﬁcations reported in Table 3, moving from complete domestic sourcing to complete
international sourcing is associated with an increase in inventory holdings of between 85 to 170
percent. Based on the sales-weighted linear regression, in the Chilean data an establishment that
sources completely domestically will hold 18.7 percent of its annual needs in inventories while
a complete international sourcer will hold 35.5 percent. Converting these to monthly numbers,
we can infer that plants tend to have 2.2 months of domestic inputs on hand and 4.3 months of
imported goods on hand.
Import Transactions at a US Steel Wholesaler
We now focus on a single wholesaler that purchases both domestically and internationally.
The data are from a US steel wholesaler from 1997 to 2006 and are unique in that they are
transaction-level data.17 We conﬁrm that shipments are larger and less frequent for international
purchases than domestic purchases. Over this period, this ﬁrm purchased 3,573 diﬀerent types
of goods divided between 12,472 domestic purchases and 5,632 international purchases.18 We
17For a summary of the data see Hall and Rust (2000). We thank George Hall and John Rust for providing
these data.
18We only know whether deliveries are domestic or foreign and have no additional information on the geographic
origin.
9ﬁnd that for the typical product, international orders tend to be about 50 percent larger and
occur nearly half as frequently as domestic orders.
For each good j delivered on date t either from the US or overseas, k ∈ {D,F}, we have data
on the value, vk
jt, quantity, qk
jt, (either units or weight) and price, pk
jt, of the transaction. Panel
B of Table 4 presents the results of separate regressions of quantity, price, and amount on good
and year ﬁxed eﬀects and a dummy for the foreign order
lnx
k
jt = ct + cj + ck.
Clearly, imported orders are larger in value and quantity and are cheaper. In Panel C we report
the results of a regression of the amount imported on
lnq
k
jt = ct + cj + ck + αlnp
k
jt
We ﬁnd an elasticity of demand of ˆ α = −2.1 and an order size premium of 48 percent (in logs).
Panel D reports the mean and median interval between orders of each good. To compute
these intervals, let Dk
j denote the number of days between the date of the ﬁrst and last order of
good j and let Nk







denote the mean duration between orders of good j from source country k.F r o mp a n e lD ,w e
see that domestic goods are purchased every 100 days, while the foreign goods are purchased
every 204.5 days.
C. Lumpiness of International Transactions
To what extent do the lumpy international transactions of a particular US steel importer
reﬂect importing behavior generally?
We document ﬁndings of lumpy transactions for a broad range of disaggregate imported goods
(over 10,000 goods deﬁned by their 10-digit Harmonized System codes and exiting district)
19This measure understates the typical interval since goods with long durations will be censored.
10using monthly data on US exports. The data are comprehensive of US merchandise exports
from January 1990 to April 2005, and include monthly totals of exported quantity, value, and
number of individual transactions by destination country and exiting customs district. We focus
on exports to six importing countries: Argentina (2002), Brazil (1999), South Korea (1997),
Mexico (1994), Russia (1998), and Thailand (1997). Each of these six countries experienced a
large devaluation and so is of particular interest to our quantitative exercise.
Table 5 presents lumpiness statistics for the (trade-weighted) median good of each of the six
countries.20 Ideally, we would like to capture the extent of lumpiness in the purchases of a single
importer and a single product. However, as the ﬁrst row shows, the median good is transacted
multiple times in months when it is traded. This is particularly true for Mexico, where the
median good is traded 32.7 times a month.21 We view these data as likely aggregating the
shipments of multiple importers or multiple products, and so they understate the lumpiness of
any individual importer’s purchases of a single product. The lumpiness of a single importer’s
purchases is most closely approximated by Argentina (2.3 transactions per month) and Russia
(2.7).
The ﬁrst evidence of lumpiness is that goods are traded infrequently over the course of a year.
The second row shows, for each country, the fraction of months that the median good in the
sample is exported. This fraction ranges from 0.11 (Russia) to 0.69 (Mexico) but may overstate
lumpiness, since some goods move in and out of the sample. The third row gives the fraction of
months the median good is exported in years when it is exported to the country at least once.
With the exception of Mexico, whose median good is traded quite frequently (0.91 fraction of
months), the other countries import their median good roughly half the months (0.43-0.70).
Mere frequency of trade also understates the degree of lumpiness, however, because most of
the value of trade is concentrated in still fewer months. One way of summarizing this concen-
20Trade weighted means have comparable lumpiness measures, but the mean number of transactions per month
greatly exceeds the median.
21Mexico is also unique in that much of trade is transported by ground rather than by sea or air.







where si is the share of annual trade accounted for by month i. The index ranges from 1/12
(equal trade in each month) to one (all trade concentrated in a single month). If annual trade
were distributed equally across n months in a year, then the HH would equal 1/n.T h e H H
indexes for all countries but Mexico range from 0.26 to 0.45. If all trade were equally distributed
across months, these numbers would translate into roughly two to four shipments per year.
Finally, the last three rows constitute another measure of concentration: the fraction of
annual trade accounted for by the months with the highest trade in a given year for the median
good. The numbers show that the top month accounts for a sizable fraction (ranging from
0.36-0.53, excluding Mexico), while the top three months account for the vast majority of trade
(0.70-0.85), and the top ﬁve months account for nearly all of annual trade (0.86-0.95).
This high level of concentration does not appear to be driven by seasonalities, as Table 6
shows. The top half of the table reproduces the HH index and fraction of trade numbers from
Table 5, where the fractions are the fraction of trade in a given year. The numbers in the
bottom half reproduce the analogous numbers for the fraction of trade in a given month (e.g.,
December) across years in the data. For these numbers, trade is normalized by annual trade to
prevent concentrations from developing by secular changes in trade.22 The numbers show that,
except for Mexico, there is even more concentration within a given month, but across years.
The numbers are not strictly comparable, however, since the bottom row shows that there are
fewer years when a good is imported than months in a year. Nevertheless, the HH numbers
greatly exceed 1/(total number of years traded), so there is still a great deal of concentration.
22Shares for month i in year j are deﬁned as follows:












12Hence, lumpiness does not appear to be a result of seasonalities in which goods are traded only
in certain months every year, but consistently each year.
Table 7 shows that lumpiness is also not driven by one particular type of good but is pervasive
across diﬀerent types of goods. The table presents lumpiness statistics by end-use categories
(for Argentina). There is some variation, with food being the most lumpy (HH =0 .53) and
automobiles and automotive parts being the least lumpy (HH =0 .35), but even these numbers
are similar to the overall number (HH =0 .42). The fraction of trade accounted for by the top
one, three, and ﬁve months is also similar across end-use categories.
In summary, annual trade of disaggregated goods is heavily concentrated in very few months.
This lumpiness or concentration is pervasive across diﬀerent types of import goods, and does
not appear to be driven by seasonalities. Finally, this evidence of aggregated trade ﬂows likely
understates the lumpiness of transactions to individual importers, since the monthly data contain
multiple transactions that likely reﬂect multiple purchasers. Thus, the frictions documented
earlier seem to manifest themselves in lumpy international transactions and larger inventory
holdings.
3. Model
Here we consider the partial equilibrium23 problem of a monopolistically competitive importer
that faces ﬁxed costs of importing a storable foreign good, a one-period lag between the ordering
and delivery of goods, and uncertain demand. We start by characterizing the importer’s optimal
decision rules in an environment in which the only source of uncertainty is demand shocks for
its product.24 We then assume a continuum of importers that are otherwise identical except
for their diﬀerent histories of preference shocks, and we aggregate their decision rules in order
23Understanding the source of the large devaluation and terms of trade movement is beyond the scope of
this paper. Our focus is solely on the propogation of this relative price change. General equilibrium models
that attribute these relative price movements to productivity, demand or interest rate shocks have proven to be
unsuccessful at generating large real exchange rate movements and hence we remain silent about the source of
the shock. Similar to Mendoza (1995), we treat the terms of trade as exogenous.
24There are many ways to put heterogeneity into the model that will help to capture the large and infrequent
orders we observe in the data. Our approach is to have idiosyncratic demand shocks. An alternative approach
would be to have idiosyncratric shocks to the cost of ordering (as in Khan and Thomas, 2007a) or idiosyncratic
shocks to productivity (as in Alessandria and Choi, 2007a) or uncertainty in the delivery process.
13to characterize the ergodic distribution of importer-level inventory holdings. Finally, we char-
acterize the transition dynamics in response to an unanticipated change in the relative price of
imported to domestically produced goods, considering both permanent and temporary changes.
Formally, we consider a small open economy inhabited by a large number of identical, inﬁnitely
lived importers, indexed by j.I ne a c hp e r i o dt, each importer experiences one of inﬁnitely many
events, ηt. Let ηt =( η0,...,ηt) denote the history of events up to period t.
Let pj(ηt) denote the price charged by importer j in state ηt and let νj(ηt) denote the
importer-speciﬁcd e m a n dd i s t u r b a n c e .νj(ηt) is assumed iid across ﬁrms and time. We assume






Let ωj = ω be the wholesale per-unit cost of imported goods, assumed constant across all
importers. We will interpret changes in ω as changes in the relative price of (at-the-dock)
imported goods to that of domestic goods. In addition, we assume that the importer faces an
additional, ﬁxed (i.e., independent of the quantity imported) cost of importing every period in
which it imports. Consistent with the absence of any scale eﬀects in inventory holdings among
Chilean plants, we follow Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) and assume that this adjustment cost
is an “opportunity cost,” that is, proportional to the ﬁrm’s revenue. The ﬁrm that imports loses
af r a c t i o n ,(1 − λ), of its revenue, pj(ηt)qj(ηt),w h e r eq is quantity sold by the ﬁrm.26,27
Given that the imported good is storable, the ﬁrm will ﬁnd it optimal to import infrequently















where mi is consumption of imported good j, h is consumption of the domestic
good and α, the weight on imported goods, is assumed to be close to 0. Normalizing the price of home goods to
1 would yield the demand functions in the text.
26Assuming a ﬁx e dc o s tt h a ti si n d e p e n d e n to fh o wm u c ht h eﬁrm sells would increase the relative importance
of adjustment costs the ﬁrm faces after an increase in the relative price of imports, ω, (and thus a decline in
revenues), and amplify the eﬀect of the shock (by lowering trade volumes, the fraction of importing ﬁrms, and
raising prices importers charge), without aﬀecting results qualitatively. These alternative results are available
from the authors upon request.
27The assumption that ﬁxed costs are proportional to measures of ﬁrm activity has often been used in earlier
work, especially in environments in which shocks have permanent eﬀects, since it is needed to ensure stationarity
of decision rules. See, e.g., Danziger (1999) and Gertler and Leahy (2007).
14and carry non-zero holdings of inventories from one period to another. Let sj(ηt) be the stock of
inventory the importer starts with at the beginning of the period at history ηt. Given this stock
of inventory, the ﬁrm has two options: pay the adjustment cost (1 − λ)pj(ηt)qj(ηt) and import
ij(ηt) > 0 new units of inventory; or save the ﬁx e dc o s ta n dn o ti m p o r t ,i . e . ,s e tij(ηt)=0 .
Implicit in this formulation is the assumption that inventory investment is irreversible, i.e.,
re-exports of previously imported goods, ij(ηt) < 0 are ruled out.28
We also assume a one-period lag between orders of imports and delivery. That is, sales of the
importer,q j(ηt), are constrained to not exceed the ﬁrm’s beginning-of-period stock of inventory:
qj(η





The amount the importer orders today, ij(ηt), cannot be used for sales until next period. In









where δ is the depreciation rate. We assume that inventory in transit ij(ηt) depreciates at the
same rate as inventory in the importer’s warehouse, sj(ηt) − qj(ηt). Figure 2 summarizes the
timing assumptions in the model.
The ﬁrm’s problem can be concisely summarized by the following system of two functional
Bellman equations. Let V a(s,ν) denote the ﬁrm’s value of adjusting its stock of inventory and
V n(s,ν) denote the value of inaction, as a function of its beginning-of-period stock of inventory
and its demand shock. Let V (s,ν)=m a x [ V a(s,ν),Vn(s,ν)] denote the ﬁrm’s value. Then the
28Aj u s t i ﬁcation for this assumption is that one-time re-exports may be prohibitively expensive. In addition to
any ﬁxed transaction costs, ﬁrms are likely to face large costs involved with exporting as emphasized by Roberts
and Tybout (1997). Introducing a ﬁxed cost of returning the good along with a iceberg shipping costs would






















(1 − δ)[s − q(p,s,v)+i]
(1 − δ)[s − q(p,s,v)]
if adjust
if don’t adjust
The expectations on the right-hand sides of the Bellman equations are taken with respect to the
distribution of demand shocks ν. We assume ν ∼ N(0,σ2).
A. Optimal Policy Rules
We next characterize the optimal decision rules for the ﬁrm’s problem.29 In particular, we
characterize {pa(s,ν),p n(s,ν)} the prices the ﬁrm charges conditional on adjusting or not its
inventory holdings, i(s,ν),t h eﬁrm’s purchases of inventory conditional on importing, as well
as φ(s,ν),t h eﬁrm’s binary adjustment decision.
Figure 3 depicts the inaction and adjustment regions in the (s,v) space, together with the
optimal level of inventory holdings,s 0, conditional on ﬁrm adjusting. Inventory numbers are
normalized relative to mean sales in this economy. The ﬁgure shows that all ﬁrms that decide
to import will start next period with inventories that are roughly 7 periods worth of average
sales, regardless of their current state. Notice that the optimal import level satisﬁes ω =
β(1−δ)EVs(s0,v0), and, given the iid nature of demand shocks,s 0 is independent of the current
state of the ﬁrm. The ﬁgure also shows that the cutoﬀ inventory level that makes a ﬁrm
indiﬀerent between importing and not decreases in the ﬁrm’s demand level, v. Firms with high
29We solve this problem numerically, using spline polynomial approximations to approximate the two value
functions, and Gaussian quadrature to compute the integrals on the right-hand side of the Bellman equations.
Details are available from the authors upon request.
16v face large adjustment costs as their revenue is higher: they therefore adjust only when current
inventories hit a suﬃciently low level.
We next turn to the optimal pricing of the ﬁrm.30 Notice that when current inventory holdings
do not constrain current sales, the optimal price the ﬁrm charges is generally proportional to
the ﬁrm’s marginal valuation of an additional unit of inventories (which will, in this economy

















In turn, the marginal value of inventories, Vs, decreases with the current stock of inventories.
Ultimately, the value of the marginal unit of inventory is realized when the ﬁrm next adjusts
inventory. At that time, it is either valued at ω, since it reduces needed inventory purchases,
or it is sold in a stock-out situation, in which case it has a higher valuation. High inventory
levels lower the probability that the marginal unit will be needed in a stock-out situation, and,
in expectation, it shifts the next adjustment date into the future. Higher expected discounting
and depreciation costs lower its expected value. Hence, both the marginal valuation and the
price are falling in the stock of inventories.
Figure 4 illustrates the ﬁrm’s price functions, in the s space. Clearly, the decision of whether
to order new inventories aﬀects next period’s beginning of period inventories and thus the
marginal valuation of an additional unit of inventory. This marginal valuation is reﬂected in
the ﬁrm’s price. Consider ﬁrst the pa(s,ν) schedule, the ﬁrm’s price, conditional on importing.
30Aguirregabiria (1999) and Hall and Rust (2000) also study the optimal markup decisions in economies with
inventory adjustment frictions but without lags.
17Again, we suppress the ν argument in this ﬁgure and set the level of demand to its steady state
mean. Notice that pa(s) initially decreases with s,t h e nﬂattens out, and then decreases again
when s is suﬃciently high. The ﬁrst portion of this schedule is one where s is suﬃciently low
for the ﬁrm to not be able to meet demand if it charges the price that would be optimal in the
absence of the constraint that ﬁrm’s sales must not exceed its inventory. The importer thus
charges a price that ensures that it sells all of its currently available inventory. The ﬁrm’s price
in this region is implicitly deﬁned by:
vp
−θ = s
Consider next the second, ﬂat region. If the ﬁrm does not stock out and adjusts its inventory, its
price next period is independent of current inventories for most of the region of the parameter
space. This is the region in which s>v p −θ, and thus, as long as the irreversibility constraint
i>0 is not binding, the ﬁrm’s problem is, by inspection of the Bellman equation, independent
of s. Intuitively, because two ﬁrms that adjust today start with the same level of inventories next
period, they will also charge identical prices. Thus, the ﬁrm’s beginning-of-period inventories
next period, and thus its shadow valuation of current-period inventories, β(1 − δ)EVs(s0,ν0),
and its price are all independent of s.
Finally, when s is suﬃciently high (such that next period’s inventories are above the return
point in Figure 3), the ﬁr mh a sm o r ei n v e n t o r yt h a ni tw o u l dﬁnd optimal to hold given the size
of its ﬁxed costs and the rate at which the goods depreciate, δ. In this region, every additional
unit of inventories increases the likelihood that this inventory will not be exhausted for one
additional period, and therefore increases the carrying cost of inventories. The ﬁrm therefore
lowers its price to increase its sales and lowers this inventory carrying cost.
We next turn to the ﬁrm’s pricing function conditional on adjusting its stock of inventories,
pn(s,ν). As Figure 4 illustrates, this price is decreasing in the ﬁrm’s level of inventories for the
entire region of the parameter space and converges to λpa(s,ν) whenever s is suﬃciently high
and EVs(s0,v 0) is equal for ﬁrms that adjust and those that do not. Firms that do not adjust
18value an additional unit of inventory because it lowers the probability of a stockout, as well as
the expected time until the next adjustment, which lowers the adjustment costs. The higher the
ﬁrm’s stock of inventory, the lower the probabilities of these two events are, and thus the lower
is a non-adjusting ﬁrm’s shadow value of its inventory, and thus the ﬁrm’s price.
To conclude, our economy is characterized by the familiar (S,s) adjustment rules for inven-
tories whereas ﬁrms import every time their inventory stock drops beyond a threshold that
depends on current demand conditions. Moreover, ﬁrm prices in general decrease in the ﬁrm’s
current stock of inventories.
4. Model Parameterization
We choose parameters in our model in order to match the salient features of the frequency
and lumpiness of trade, as well as the information on inventories from the Chilean plant-level
data. We interpret the length of the period as one month, consistent with the evidence that lags
between orders and delivery in international trade are 1-2 months. We set the discount factor
β to 0.94
1
12 to correspond to a 6 percent annual real interest rate.
To set the depreciation rate δ, we draw on a large literature that documents inventory carrying
costs for the US. Annual non-interest inventory carrying costs range31 from 19 to 43 percent
of a ﬁrm’s inventories, which imply monthly carrying costs ranging from 1.5 to 3.5 percent.32.
We thus choose δ =0 .025, in the mid-range of these estimates. Given that Gausch and Kogan
(2001) ﬁnd that inventory costs in developing countries are about three times higher than in the
US, we also consider an alternate, high depreciation rate parameterization.
The elasticity of demand for a ﬁrm’s products, θ,is set equal to 1.5, a typical choice used in the
international business cycle literature, which, in turn, reﬂects the low elasticities of substitution
between imported and domestic goods estimated using time-series data. Given that in our model
the substitution elasticity is also tightly linked to the ﬁrms’ markups, we break this link between
the Armington elasticity for imports and ﬁrm markups in a robustness check below.
31These include taxes, warehousing, physical handling, obsolescence, pilfering, insurance, and clerical controls.
32See, e.g., Richardson (1995).
19Two other parameters, λ, the adjustment cost, and σ2, the volatility of demand shocks
are jointly chosen in order for the model to accord with two features of the microdata. The
ﬁrst target is the lumpiness of trade ﬂows documented in the microdata. Recall that the trade-
weighted median HH indexes are equal to 0.42 in Argentina and 0.45 in Russia, the two countries
in our sample with the least number of individual transactions per HS-10 digit product category
and for which lumpiness at this level of disaggregation most closely corresponds to lumpiness at
the ﬁrm level. We thus ask our model to match a concentration ratio of 0.44. Second, consistent
with the Chilean data, we target an annual inventory-to-purchases ratio of 36 percent.33
In addition to the two parameters above, we compare several additional “over-identifying”
moments in the model and the data. Hummels (2001) provides the following calculation that
may be useful in assessing our choice of demand volatility. Using data on air and vessel shipping
times, freight rate diﬀerentials on air versus vessel transportation modes, as well as the importer’s
choice of a particular transportation mode, he ﬁnds that a 30-day lag between order and delivery
is valued by US importers at 12 to 24 percent of the shipment’s value. In our model, the one-
period lag is costly for two reasons. First, a proportion δ of the shipment is assumed to depreciate
in transit. More important, importers that face more uncertain demand will ﬁnd it optimal to
have higher holdings of inventory in order to ensure they have suﬃcient inventory to meet
demand in states of the world when the level of demand is high. Thus, a measure of the ﬁrm’s
losses incurred because of the one-period lag between orders and delivery may provide useful
information about the demand uncertainty an importer faces. We compute the ﬁrm’s losses by
solving the problem of a ﬁrm that is subject to ﬁxed costs of importing but no lags in shipping.
33Our model abstracts from ﬁnished-good inventories so we include both materials and ﬁnished-goods inven-
tories in our deﬁnition of inventories in the data. Given the ﬁxed costs of importing and no other frictions or
diﬀerences in depreciation rates, importers are presumably indiﬀerent between holding the imported intermediate
goods as material inventories or ﬁnished-good inventories.
20In particular, the problem of a ﬁrm in an environment with no time-to-ship is characterized by
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where, unlike in the previous problem, the ﬁrm is assumed able to sell out of its current-period
imports:
q(p,s)=m i n ( νp
−θ,s+ i)
We compute the diﬀerence between the two ﬁrms’ values, conditional on adjustment, relative to
the expected present value of an importer’s imports in our original setup,
ˆ V a−V a
E
S∞
t=0 βtωit for a ﬁrm
that enters the period with no inventories.
Another piece of evidence we use to gauge the robustness of our calibration is direct measures
of ﬁxed costs. Recall that, depending on whether we use medians or means to compute average
shipments, these range from 3 to 11 percent in the data. Finally, we also report the fraction of
months an importer pays the ﬁxed costs and imports, as well as the fraction of one year’s trade
accounted for by the top month and the top three months.
The upper panel of Table 8 reports the moments we ask the model to match, as well as the
additional moments, in the model and in the data. The lower panel of Table 8 reports the choice
of parameter values that we use. Notice, in the lower panel, that we require demand shocks with
a standard deviation of σ =1 .1 in order for importers to be willing to hold the high inventory
values we observe in the Chilean data given the frequency with which they import. This number
should not be interpreted literally, since given our calibration strategy and parsimonious setup,
it reﬂects additional sources of uncertainty (productivity shocks, as well as shocks to the cost or
lags in delivering goods) that lead importers to hold the high levels of inventory observed in the
data. For example, Burstein and Hellwig (2007) ﬁnd that a standard deviation of demand shocks
21equal to 0.21-0.30 is necessary to account for the joint comovement of prices and quantities in
grocery stores, a number much smaller than our estimate of demand volatility. This suggests that
other sources of uncertainty are necessary in order to account for the large inventory holdings
observed in the Chilean data and is consistent with the ﬁndings of Khan and Thomas (2007b)
that stockout-avoidance motives for inventory holdings are diﬃcult to reconcile with the large
inventory holdings observed in the data.
The ﬁxed cost of importing amounts to 1 − λ =0 .14 in our calibration: the ﬁrm loses 14
percent of its current revenues every time it adjusts. Turning to the upper panel of Table
8, notice that our parsimonious model is capable of reproducing not only the annual import
concentration ratios in the US export data and the Chilean inventory/purchases ratios, but also
the additional, over-identifying moments we have not used for calibration. In particular, the top
month of the year accounts for 50 percent of the year’s value of trade in the model (53 percent
in the data). The average cost of importing, expressed relative to the value of the average
shipment, is 4.4 percent and thus is in the range of the ﬁxed costs we have directly measured
in the data. Moreover, the thought experiment in Hummels (2001) suggests that the volatility
of demand shocks is not excessively large in our model. Importers under our calibration are
willing to pay 4.3 percent of their average shipment value in order to avoid a one-period delay,
a number that is much lower than similar measures reported by Hummels (12 to 24 percent).34
5. Results
Before we describe the numerical experiments we perform on our model, we brieﬂy show that
the salient features of the terms of trade and trade ﬂows observed in Argentina’s devaluation
are also present in the devaluations in Brazil (January 1999), Korea (October 1997), Mexico
(December 1994), Russia (August 1998), and Thailand (July 1997).
34This low number in part reﬂects the fact that an additional cost of demand uncertainty (uncertainty in the
size of the adjustment cost the ﬁrm faces that leads ﬁrms to hold higher inventories) is not eliminated here when
we eliminate the lag in shipment. In the earlier version of this paper with a ﬁxed cost independent of importer
revenue, the corresponding Hummels statistics was 11 percent.
22A. Salient Features of Large Devaluations
The ﬁrst column of Figure 5 plots the change in the terms of trade, measured as the ratio of
t h ei m p o r tp r i c et ot h ed o m e s t i cP P I .I nl o g s ,t h ep e a kc h a n g er a n g e sf r o ma b o u t3 1p e r c e n ti n
Korea to nearly 100 percent in Russia, with the peak generally within the ﬁrst few months of
the initial devaluation. In all countries, the terms of trade remains elevated after 15 months.
The second column of charts plots the change in the real value of imports from the US and
in total. All countries experience a large and fairly rapid decline in both import measures
immediately following the devaluation.35 While US trade ﬂows are generally more volatile than
total imports, US trade tracks total imports quite well. Focusing on imports from the US
provides two distinct advantages. First, it allows us to study high-frequency changes in trade
ﬂows at a very disaggregate level. Hence we can measure both the extensive and intensive
margins of trade. Second, because trade is measured at the US dock, we can measure the
immediate response of trade shipments rather than deliveries, which are more subject to delivery
lags.36
The third column of charts plots two measures of the dynamics of the extensive margin. The
ﬁrst measure is the number of distinct HS-10 varieties imported from the US The second, more
disaggregate, measure is a count of the number of transactions. In all countries, both measures
of the extensive margin follow a pattern similar to real imports, with the peak decline ranging
from 50 to 100 percent of the overall decline in trade volume.
T a b l e9s h o w st h a ta l t e r n a t em e a s u r e so fc h a n g e si nt h ee x t e n s i v em a r g i nt h a tw e i g h tg o o d s
by their importance in trade are consistent with the simple counts reported in Figure 5. For
each country and each measure, we report the share of the drop in the US import volume
accounted for by the change in the extensive margin.37 The top panel reports the role of the
35Thailand’s trade and price dynamics are a bit more gradual. This is in part due to the two major devaluation
episodes in a six-month period.
36In the 6 years around the large devaluations, changes in US exports to a destination are positively correlated
with changes in imports in that country for all but Thailand. For Argentina, Russia, and Thailand, US exports
tend to slightly lead changes in total imports.
37To remove the changes in imports from NAFTA from the Mexican data, we weight Mexican goods by their
pre-NAFTA (pre 1994) trade ﬂows in all experiments. As evident from comparing methods 2 and 3, weighting
either based on trade in the pre-devaluation period or the whole sample has a very minor impact on our measures
23e x t e n s i v em a r g i ni nt h em o n t hi nw h i c hi m p o r t s bottom out, while the bottom panel reports
the average role of the extensive margin in a 3-month window around this month. For each
weighting/ﬁltering method, we report a measure of changes in the number of transactions and
the number of goods imported. In all cases, the transaction-based measures attribute a more
important role to the extensive margin. On average, focusing on the bottom panel, the data
shows that the extensive margin accounts for about two-thirds of the decline in peak trade ﬂows.
In addition to the salient features documented in Figure 5 and Table 9, Burstein et al.
(2005) persuasively show that each nominal exchange rate devaluation in these countries is also
associated with a rapid and almost one-for-one increase in the country’s local currency import
price index, but a slower rise in the domestic price of importables.
These results, although plagued by the measurement issues introduced by our inability to
observe ﬁrm-level decision rules, provide a lower bound on the importance of the extensive
margin of trade in accounting for the sharp current account reversals following a crisis. We next
ask whether our calibrated model can account for these features of the data.
B. Model Experiments
As Figure 5 illustrated, the countries in our sample experience an average increase in the
relative price of imported goods of about 50 percent that only gradually reverts over time. We
thus start by modeling a devaluation as an unanticipated,38 permanent increase in ω by this
amount.39
Figure 6 illustrates the ergodic distribution of ﬁrm inventory holdings, as well as the adjust-
ment hazards, in the pre- and post-devaluation steady states. Inventory holdings in both cases
are normalized by mean sales of the importer in the pre-crisis steady state. Consider ﬁrst the
upper panel, which illustrates the pre-crisis steady state. Firms that have paid the ﬁxed cost in
of the extensive margin for the other 5 countries.
38While interest rates tend to rise prior to crises, the increases tend to be small relative to the subsequent
depreciation, suggesting from uncovered interest parity that a large part of the devaluation is unanticipated.
39Our approach follows the tradition in the small open-economy literature of taking changes in relative prices
and later interest rates as exogenous. We then work out the implications of these changes in relative prices
holding all else equal.
24the previous period have the same level of inventories, roughly 6.5 periods of mean sales. They
account for roughly 22 percent of all ﬁrms in the distribution. The rest of the ﬁrms are those
that have adjusted in previous periods: the furthe ri nt h ep a s tt h e yh a v ea d j u s t e da n dt h el a r g e r
the demand realizations, the smaller their inventory holdings are. As a ﬁrm’s inventory holdings
decrease, there is an increased probability that the ﬁrm will experience a demand disturbance
suﬃciently large that it will ﬁnd it optimal to adjust. The adjustment hazard is thus increasing
for ﬁrms with lower levels of inventories. As a ﬁrm’s inventory values reach close to one period’s
worth of mean sales, the ﬁrm ﬁnds it optimal to pay the ﬁxed cost and import with probability
one.
The qualitative shapes of the ergodic density and adjustment hazards are virtually identical.
Now, however, the higher relative wholesale price of imports makes it optimal for importers to
increase the price they charge for their goods and sell less. They now ﬁnd it optimal to lower
imports by −θ∆ω (in logs) relative to the pre-crisis steady state. Prices and quantities change
proportionally given that the ﬁxed cost is proportional to revenues. Moreover, the adjustment
hazard shifts to the left. As a result, ﬁrms with inventory holdings that would render adjustment
optimal in the pre-crisis steady state are now less likely to pay the ﬁxed costs and import.
We are interested in characterizing the transition to the new post-crisis steady state. Given
t h el e f t w a r ds h i f to ft h eh a z a r di nF i g u r e6 ,o n ec a ne x p e c tt h a ta sar e s u l to ft h ec h a n g ei n
the relative price of imported goods, ﬁrms that would have otherwise imported will now ﬁnd it
optimal to postpone adjustment. As a result the fraction of goods imported will drop precipi-
tously following the crisis as ﬁrms run down their now higher-than-desired levels of inventories
acquired prior to the crisis. This drop in the extensive margin of trade will last until ﬁrms
exhaust their higher-than-desired levels of inventories and the economy converges from the pre-
to the post-devaluation steady state.
The optimal price functions that were illustrated in Figure 4 also shift to the left by a factor
of 1.5−θ and up by 1.5 as a result of the change in the relative price of imports. As a result, given
the downward sloping price-inventory schedule in this economy and the high initial inventory
holdings during the transition, ﬁrms will not pass-through the increase in the wholesale price of
25imports fully to consumers, thus lowering their markups.
The left panel of Figure 7 illustrates the response of prices in our model economy (the response
in the benchmark economy discussed above is illustrated using a solid line). Notice that on
impact the retail price of imports (the consumption-weighted average price of imported goods)
rises slower than the wholesale price of imports: the pass-through immediately after the change
in relative prices is only 75 percent. As ﬁrms exhaust their inventory holdings, they ﬁnd it
optimal to raise prices and the economy converges to the new steady state. The central insight
here is that even without price adjustment costs, sources of strategic complementarities or local
factor content, ﬁrms will choose to pass-through changes in international relative prices less than
one-for-one to consumers, since their optimal prices are proportional to their marginal valuation
of inventories, which, in times of crisis, may diﬀer substantially from the replacement cost of
inventories.
The middle panel of Figure 7 illustrates the response of import volumes. The higher relative
price of imports leads initially to a trade implosion: a drop in import values that is 4 times
larger than the change in the relative price, much larger than the θ =1 .5 drop that a frictionless
economy would generate. As the right panel of Figure 7 shows, this large initial drop in imports
is to a large extent accounted for by a sharp drop in the extensive margin of trade: the fraction
of importing ﬁrms drops to 40 percent of its steady state value (close to -1 in logs). Thus the
extensive margin accounts for roughly 2/3 (-1/-1.6) of the drop in imports in the model economy
immediately after the devaluation. As ﬁrms run down their higher-than-desired inventories,
import volumes converge to the new steady state level of 1.5−θ and the fraction of importing
ﬁrms returns to 22 percent. This transition lasts for about 10 months.
C. Sensitivity
Devaluations are also associated with sharp increases in interest rates and consumption
declines in the aﬀected economies. In the next set of experiments we show that adding these
forces as exogenous shocks in our model economy lowers the initial pass-through of prices and
ampliﬁes the trade implosion during the transition. In addition, we illustrate the role of local
26factor content, size of markups, persistence of the relative price shocks as well as decompose the
role of lags in shipment and ﬁxed costs of importing in accounting for our results.
Interest Rate Increase
We ﬁrst focus on the increase in interest rates. The EMBI+ spread that captures the average
spread of sovereign external debt securities rose by as much as 7000 basis points in Argentina,
2400 basis points in Brazil, 1600 basis points in Mexico, 1400 basis points in Russia, and 950
points in Thailand. We thus also associate a crisis with a permanent drop in the discount factor
to β = .7
1
12, which corresponds to a 24 percent rise in annual real interest rates, in addition to
the 1.5-fold increase in ω. As the left panel of Figure 8 (dotted line) shows, this additional shock
makes ﬁrms even more reluctant to raise prices in response to the increase in the wholesale price
of imports. The drop in β increases the carrying cost of inventories and makes ﬁrms even more
willing to exhaust current inventory holdings by keeping retail prices low. The initial increase in
retail prices is only 0.23 and only 50 percent of its long-run level. Notice also that retail prices
overshoot the wholesale price in the new steady state given the permanently higher inventory
carrying cost associated with the interest-rate increase. Firms hold smaller inventory levels now
and import more frequently and are thus more likely to stockout and charge higher prices.
Additional Consumption Drop
The next experiment, also illustrated in Figure 8 using dash-dot lines, associates the de-
valuation with an additional 15 percent exogenous drop in demand for imports to capture
the aggregate consumption drops in episodes of devaluation. The forces discussed above are
even stronger with this experiment since the incentive to shed higher-than-desired inventories
is stronger, and, indeed, changes in consumption are merely a transformation of changes in ω.
As a result, the initial drop in trade is even more severe and the pass-through of retail prices
smaller than in the benchmark economy.
27Local Factor Content
We next consider an economy in which importers produce ﬁnal output using labor l and




Consistent with the Chilean data, we set the share of labor, α,t o2 5p e r c e n t .T h ee x p e r i m e n tw e
consider is again a one-time, permanent rise in ω of the same magnitude as that in our benchmark
experiment. Consistent with the evidence, we assume that local wages do not respond to the
devaluation.40 Figure 8 (the line marked with circles) illustrates the economy’s transition to the
new steady state. Our results are qualitatively similar. Prices at the retail level respond less
than one-for-one even in the long run since the importer’s marginal cost of producing the good
rises less than ω. Similarly, the drop in trade volumes is smaller.
Fixed Costs vs. Time-to-ship
What is the relative strength of the two frictions to international trade we emphasize in this
paper? To understand their separate contributions in generating the large drop in imports after
the devaluations, we solve the transition following a permanent rise in ω in economies identical
to our benchmark economy except for assuming 1) no lags between orders and delivery, and 2)
no ﬁxed costs of importing. These economies are not re-calibrated; rather, all parameter values
(except for the ﬁxed cost in the no cost economy) are set to their values in the benchmark
economy. Table 8 shows that the degree of lumpiness in the ‘no lag’ economy is the same as in
the benchmark setup; the diﬀerence is that ﬁrms now hold 75 percent of the level of inventories
in the economy with lags since now the stockout-avoidance motive for holding inventories is
reduced. In contrast, the absence of ﬁxed costs reduces the degree of lumpiness and lowers
inventories even more, to 60 percent of their value in the benchmark economy. Thus it appears
that ﬁxed costs of importing are a stronger motive for holding inventories than the lags in
40More precisely, prices are relative to the domestic good, so we are assuming that wages move one-for-one
with domestic prices.
28shipment. Figure 8 conﬁrms this insight. The ﬁgure shows that the pass-through of prices
is lower in the economy without lags in which the ﬁxed costs are the only motive for holding
inventories than in the economy with no ﬁxed costs and ﬁrms hold inventories to insure against
demand variation. Roughly two-thirds of the incomplete pass-through in the model is thus due
to ﬁxed costs, whereas the rest is due to lags in shipping. Finally, notice that although the
initial reduction in trade ﬂo w si ss h a r p e ri nt h ee c o n o m yw i t hn oﬁxed costs, the transition is
much shorter so that the over shooting in trade is larger in the ‘no lags’ economy.41
Low Markups
Recall that typical estimates of the Armington elasticity of substitution we have used above,
θ =1 .5, imply counterfactually high markups. We next perform a robustness experiment to
check whether our results are robust to our choice of this substitution elasticity. In particular,




















This choice of preferences allows us to maintain the empirically justiﬁed low Armington elasticity,
by setting θ =1 .5, but allows us to vary the markup importers charge. In particular, we choose
γ =4 ,a number in the range of those estimated by Hummels (2001), Gallaway, McDaniel and
Rivera (2003), and Broda and Weinstein (2006), which corresponds to a frictionless markup of
41These results are, however, sensitive to our assumption that ﬁxed costs are proportional to revenue. The
reasons ﬁxed costs are the main source of inventory holdings is that they are very volatile and ﬁrms insure against
the possibility of several high demand periods in which importing is prohibitively expensive. In an earlier version
of this paper, with ﬁxed costs independent of revenue, shipping lags were the stronger friction.









When solving for the transition path to the new steady state, we require consistency of ﬁrm
decision rules with the path for Pm to derive these decision rules.42 Figure 8 (line marked with
circles) illustrates that the response of this economy to a permanent rise in ω is similar to that
of our benchmark setup, as long as this economy is recalibrated to match the inventory holdings
and lumpiness in the data. Table 8 shows that the major diﬀerence between the economies with
high and low markups is in the parameter values necessary to match the lumpiness of trade
and inventory-to-purchase ratios in the data. The high elasticity economy requires more volatile
demand shocks and that a large share of revenues is lost when importing.
High Depreciation of Goods
The benchmark calibration assumed that non-interest inventory holding costs are similar
to U.S. levels. However, Gausch and Kogan (2001) present evidence that logistic costs are
substantially higher in developing countries; therefore, we consider an alternate parametrization
with δ =0 .04, which is at the upper end of the range of U.S. inventory depreciation rates.43
From the last column in Table 8, to match the lumpiness of trade and inventory levels requires
that ﬁxed costs represent about 25 percent of a month’s sales revenue and demand volatility of
σ =1 .3. Compared to the benchmark, with a higher rate of inventory depreciation the ﬁxed
costs and demand uncertainty must be larger to get ﬁrms to hold the same level of inventories.
From Figure 9, with a higher depreciation rate, represented by the line with circles, we
see that the price response is much more gradual while the extensive margin response is only
slightly weaker than in our benchmark calibration. Similar to the high interest rate example,
42This economy features strategic complementarities in ﬁrms’ decision rules: the lower the prices charged by
a ﬁrm’s competitors, the lower a ﬁrm’s sales, and thus the larger the inventory-holding costs. Thus, ﬁrms ﬁnd
it optimal to lower their prices. These complementarities turn out to be weak in the model, since the ﬁrm’s
problem is dynamic and current Pm have a smaller eﬀect on the ﬁrm’s decision rules than in a static economy.
43They also present evidence that inventory levels are higher in developing country, which we interpret as
evidence that trade costs we emphasize are higher for developing countries.
30the higher depreciation rate raises the cost of holding inventories. Following the shock to import
prices, ﬁrms now face larger inventory holding costs. To economize on these future inventory
costs, ﬁrms sell more today by raising prices by less than in the benchmark case. With smaller
price increases, ﬁrms work through their excess inventories faster and thus the extensive margin
declines by less.
Transitory Relative Price Changes
In most countries in our sample, the relative price of imports to the domestic producer prices
index has halved one year after the crisis. We thus model a devaluation as a 50 percent increase
in ω that geometrically decays to its original level. In particular, we assume
log(ωt/ω0)=ρlog(ωt−1/ω0)
where ω1/ω0 =1 .5 is the increase in the wholesale price of imports immediately after the crisis.
We choose ρ to ensure a half-life of 12 months. As Figure 9 indicates, the economy with a
transitory but persistent increase in the relative price of imports responds to the devaluation
similarly to our original economy. Imports drop somewhat more as importers prefer to wait
for the lower ω in future periods and postpone adjustment. Moreover, the initial pass-through
is reduced as the shadow value of inventories rises less when ﬁrms expect the wholesale price
of imports to mean-revert. As inventory holdings are depleted, the retail price of imports
overshoots the wholesale price as fewer ﬁrms import and ﬁrms hold smaller inventories on average
in expectation of a lower future replacement cost of inventories.
6. Conclusions
We have documented that importers face delivery lags and ﬁxed transacting costs. These
frictions lead to inventory-management problems that are more severe for importers and inter-
national transactions are lumpy at the micro level. We show that a parsimoniously parameterized
(S,s)− type economy successfully accounts for these features of the data. We then show that
the model incorporating the observed micro frictions predicts that in response to a large increase
31in the relative price of imported goods, as is typical in large devaluations, import values and
the number of distinct imported varieties drops sharply immediately following the shock. The
model also predicts that importers ﬁnd it optimal to reduce markups in response to the increase
in the wholesale price of imports and thus partly rationalizes the slow increase in tradeable
goods’ prices following large devaluations. These predictions of the model are quite diﬀerent
than what one would get using standard forms of trade costs, namely iceberg costs or ﬁxed costs
of exporting. Our model’s predictions are supported by the events in 6 current account reversals
following large devaluation episodes in the last decade.
The trade costs we study are particularly large for developing countries as are inventories.
An avenue for further research would be to examine whether these frictions play a role in
explaining diﬀerences in business cycles and net export dynamics between developed economies
and emerging markets. Also, the mechanism may play a role in explaining the relatively low
levels of inﬂation experienced after devaluations in prices of non-traded goods as well.
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35Data Section
• The US steel wholesaler data is from Hall and Rust (2000). The data contains information on
deliveries by date, good, value, quantity, and source (domestic or foreign).
• US trade data used to measure characteristics of trade ﬂo w si sf r o mt h eC e n s u sU SE x p o r t s
of Merchandise History DVD.
• Labor share at Chilean plants: for plant j let αjt =
wjt∗ljt
wjt∗ljt+Mjt, where wjtljt measures salary
payments to white and blue collar workers in the current period and Mjt measures current
materials purchases. The top panel of the following table reports the sample averages for
importers, non-importers and all plants. We measure both simple averages and sales-weighted
averages. In total, using simple averages, the labor share is approximately 25 percent, while
when we weight by sales we ﬁnd a substantially lower share of 14.5 percent. However, the
weighted regression of labor share on import content predicts that labor share is higher, the
larger a plant’s import content. A plant that imports all of its raw materials thus has a labor
share of about 26 percent.
Labor share in Chilean Plants




B. Controlling for import content and log employment
Constant -0.039* 0.082*
Import content 0.25* 0.186*
*S i g n i ﬁcant at 99 percent
36N o t e so nF i g u r e sa n dT a b l e s
1. Table 1: Importing costs: World Bank Doing Business Survey. Mean and Median ship-
ments: Census US Exports of Merchandise - History DVD.
2. Tables 2 and 3: Plant level data from the Chilean census (Hsieh and Parker, 2008). Ma-






2Mt . Finished inventory measures the ratio of the average stock of






2Mjt . Inventory denotes the
sum of materials inventory and ﬁnished inventory, ijt = im
jt +i
f
jt. Import content measures
the ratio of imported materials to total materials, sim
jt = Mim
jt /Mjt.
3. Table 4: Steel data from Hall and Rust (2000)
4. Tables 5 to 7 and 9: Constructed using Census US Exports of Merchandise — History
DVD.
5. Figures 1 and 5:
•Panel 1 of Figure 1: All data from BER (2005). Available at http://www.econ.ucla.edu/arielb/
AdditionalMaterialLargeDevJPE.html in pricedataJPE.xls. CPI imports constructed us-
ing microdata in BER (2005) on CPI for disaggregated product categories and origin
classiﬁcation. NER denotes monthly average Argentine Peso/$ exchange rate.
•Panel 2 of Figure 1 and Column 1 of Figure 5: The relative price of imports is the ratio of
t h eI m p o r tp r i c ed e ﬂators and Manufacturing Producer Price Indices (PPI). For import
p r i c ei n d i c e sw eu s e
1. Argentina: WPI Imports from MECON, PPI from IFS (21363...ZF...)
2. Brazil: Índice de preco das importacoes from FUNCEX (http://www.funcex.com.br/basesbd/).
This index is denominated in US dollars. We convert it into local currency using nominal
exchange rate data from IFS (223..AE.ZF...). PPI from IFS (22363...ZF...)
3. Korea: Import price index from IFS (54276.X.ZF...), PPI from IFS (54263...ZF...)
4. Mexico: Índice de precios de las importaciones from Bank of Mexico. Convert into local
currency using exchange rate data from IFS (273..AE.ZF...). PPI from IFS (27363...ZF...)
5. Thailand: Import price index from IFS (57875...ZF...), PPI from IFS (57863...ZF...)
6. Russia: given lack of data, we use nominal exchange rate from IFS (922..AE.ZF...)
instead of Import price index, PPI from IFS (92263.XXZF...).
•Panels 3 and 4 of Figure 1, Columns 2-3 of Figure 5: US Nominal Exports, transactions and
HS 10 varieties by destination are from the Census’ US Exports of Merchandise History
DVD. Total imports are from the IFS nominal dollar value and are C.I.F. Total imports
and US exports are deﬂated by the BLS’s U.S. Export Price Index.
•All variables are normalized to zero in the period prior to the exchange rate devaluation.
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Figure 3: Optimal import rules
























inventory holdings conditional on







Figure 4: Optimal price functions
beginning-of-period inventories (relative to mean sales)
optimal 
v=0 (mean demand) 
conditional on not importing 





















































































































Figure 5: Salient features of large devalutions0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Figure 6: Ergodic distribution of beginning-of-period inventories and adjustment hazard 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































conditional on importing 
Figure 9:  Transitory shock and high elasticity
wholesale p imports, benchmark
retail p imports, benchmark
retail p imports, transitory
















Value from the 
U.S.
Total Costs as 
a Fraction of 
Mean 
Shipment
Argentina 19 $1,500 $625 $12,400 0.17 $37,500 0.06
Brazil 23 $945 $625 $13,900 0.11 $63,000 0.02
Korea 11 $440 $625 $14,700 0.07 $89,300 0.01
Mexico 23 $595 $625 $10,900 0.11 $39,700 0.03
Russia 33 $937 $625 $21,000 0.07 $85,510 0.02
Thailand 20 $903 $625 $12,000 0.13 $46,147 0.03
Mean 0.11 0.03
Table 1: Time and Monetary Costs of Importing 
Notes: Import and Export Costs are U.S. dollar costs for 2006. Average shipment values are for 2004. Costs include all costs 
accrued between the contractual agreement and the delivery of goods, excluding international shipping costs, tariffs, and inland 
transportation costs. Russian import costs exclude port/terminal handling fees.
Source: World Bank (2007), http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreTopics/TradingAcrossBorders/Obs. Importers
Total 34967 0.239
Importers Total Non Importers Total Non Importers Total Non Importers Total
mean 0.345 0.082 0.249 0.335 0.269 0.197 0.253 0.210 0.052 0.087 0.060
std dev 0.286 0.203 0.823 0.368 0.741 0.788 0.324 0.706 0.162 0.438 0.257
mean 0.299 0.178 0.178 0.243 0.217 0.129 0.174 0.156 0.049 0.069 0.061
std dev 0.281 0.262 0.510 0.227 0.370 0.483 0.177 0.337 0.112 0.096 0.103
Table 2: Imports and Inventories of Chilean Manufacturers (1990 to 1996)
Import content Inventory Materials Inventory Finished Inventory
Unweighted
Weighted
Share of annual usagesim c sim c sim c sim c
0.213 0.252 0.168 0.187 0.253 0.147 0.109 0.260
10.9 59.0 22.5 78.7 59.4 157.5 5.2 61.6
0.155 0.198 0.130 0.133 0.184 0.101 0.073 0.204
8.3 48.6 19.1 61.3 59.5 149.3 3.6 50.3
0.058 0.054 0.038 0.054 0.044 0.011 0.037 0.056
14.5 61.7 18.2 81.3 67.2 79.6 8.9 66.7
0.186 0.179 0.172 0.229 0.204 0.037 0.108 0.258
9.2 11.8 22.8 23.3 48.4 11.7 5.0 15.9
Table 3: Regression Results of Inventory Holdings on Import Content 
Unweighted Weighted Robust Fixed
Notes: tstats in paretheses. "Weighted" results are by total sales. "Robust" uses a robust regression algorithm to control for outliers. 





for ln employmentGoods Purchases Value Purchases Value










Notes: t stats in parentheses.
D: Mean and Median Interval (Days)
C: Import Size Premium Controlling for Price (good-yr fixed effects)
B: Premium on Imported Goods (good-yr fixed effects)
Table 4: Statistics on Lumpiness at a US Steel Wholesaler
Domestic Foreign 
A: Summary StatisticsArgentina Brazil Korea Mexico Russia Thailand
# of transactions (in months with trade) 2.3 3.6 4.8 32.7 2.7 3.2
fraction of months good exported  0.23 0.18 0.34 0.69 0.11 0.23
fraction of months in year good exported 0.45 0.58 0.70 0.91 0.43 0.55
Herfindahl-Hirschman index  0.42 0.37 0.26 0.16 0.45 0.37
fract. of ann. trade in top mo. 0.52 0.46 0.36 0.24 0.53 0.46
fract. of ann. trade in top 3 mos. 0.84 0.76 0.70 0.53 0.85 0.78
fract. of ann. trade in top 5 mos. 0.95 0.90 0.86 0.74 0.95 0.91
Table 5: Lumpiness Statistics of Disaggregate US Exports to Different Destination Countries Argentina Brazil Korea Mexico Russia Thailand
Within Year, Across Month 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index 0.42 0.37 0.26 0.16 0.45 0.37
fract. of ann. trade in top mo. 0.52 0.46 0.36 0.24 0.53 0.46
fract. of ann. trade in top 3 mos. 0.84 0.76 0.70 0.53 0.85 0.78
fract. of ann. trade in top 5 mos. 0.95 0.90 0.86 0.74 0.95 0.91
Across Year, Within Month
Herfindahl-Hirschman index 0.50 0.60 0.33 0.15 0.75 0.45
fract. of trade in top mo. 0.60 0.69 0.45 0.25 0.80 0.55
fract. of trade in top 3 mos. 0.96 0.99 0.87 0.54 1.00 0.95
fract. of trade in top 5 mos. 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.75 1.00 1.00
median years traded 8 5 9 14 4 7










fract. of mos. exported  0.23 0.12 0.28 0.20 0.36 0.27
fract. of mos. in year exported 0.45 0.33 0.45 0.36 0.68 0.45
Herfindahl-Hirschman index 0.42 0.53 0.40 0.52 0.35 0.41
fract. of ann. trade in top mo. 0.52 0.59 0.49 0.61 0.42 0.51
fract. of ann. trade in top 3 mos. 0.84 0.89 0.83 0.90 0.74 0.84
fract. of ann. trade in top 5 mos. 0.95 0.97 0.94 0.97 0.88 0.94
Fraction of Imports from U.S. 1.0 0.02 0.42 0.13 0.06 0.07
Table 7:  Lumpiness by End Use (Argentina)
Notes: Lumpiness statistics reflect the country-specific, trade-weighted median good. Fractions of imports sum to only 0.70 across end 
uses shown. The end use of the remaining goods were military (0.19), unclassified (0.10), and re-exports.Moments







Herfindhal-Hirschmann ratio 0.44 0.44 0.42 0.44 0.13 0.44
Inventory to annual purchases ratio 0.36 0.36 0.34 0.27 0.22 0.35
Not used for calibration 
Fraction of months good is imported 0.44 0.21
Fraction of annual trade by top month 0.53 0.48
Fraction of annual trade by top 3 months 0.85 0.98
Fraction of annual trade by top 5 months 0.95 1.00
Value of avoiding 30-day lag (per shipment) 12%-24% 4.3%
Fixed cost per shipment, % 3%-11% 4.4%
Parameters
Calibrated
λ (1-share of revenue lost if import) 0.86 0.55 0.86 1 0.75
std. dev. of demand, σ 1.1 1.80 1.1 1.1 1.3
Assigned
Period length 1 month 1 month 1 month 1 month 1 month
Elasticity of demand for imports, θ 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
Elasticity of subs. across imported goods - 4 - - -
Discount factor, β 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.995
Depreciation rate, δ 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.04
Additional Experiments
Change in consumption:  ΔC=-0.15
Interest rate change:        β=0.70 (annually)
Table 8: Moments and Parameters# cards # goods # cards # goods # cards # goods # cards # goods # cards # goods
Argentina 1.12 0.84 1.25 0.60 1.33 0.71 1.12 0.71 1.05 0.73
Brazil 0.78 0.47 1.07 0.30 1.08 0.43 0.81 0.28 0.89 0.45
Korea 0.89 0.67 0.57 0.23 0.74 0.33 0.79 0.25 0.82 0.35
Mexico 1.35 0.54 1.09 0.02 1.31 0.12 0.94 1.34 1.18 0.07
Thailand 0.66 0.58 0.29 0.06 0.53 0.29 0.51 0.28 0.71 0.44
Russia 0.58 0.39 0.95 0.38 1.10 0.57 0.59 0.31 1.10 0.66
Average 0.90 0.58 0.87 0.26 1.02 0.41 0.79 0.53 0.96 0.45
# cards # goods # cards # goods # cards # goods # cards # goods # cards # goods
Argentina 0.90 0.74 0.97 0.52 1.06 0.62 0.89 0.65 0.88 0.66
Brazil 0.54 0.36 0.49 0.20 0.51 0.30 0.51 0.20 0.91 0.55
Korea 0.95 0.70 0.78 0.21 0.90 0.32 0.85 0.27 0.90 0.31
Mexico 1.55 0.31 1.36 -0.02 1.63 0.09 0.99 1.58 1.33 0.03
Thailand 0.75 0.71 0.27 0.06 0.52 0.34 0.58 0.35 0.75 0.43
Russia 0.63 0.44 1.00 0.45 1.18 0.62 0.63 0.37 1.09 0.69
Average 0.89 0.54 0.81 0.24 0.96 0.38 0.74 0.57 0.98 0.44
Goods denote distinct HS-10 categories and cards represent total number of transactions across all categories.
Table 9: Change in the Extensive Margin
A: Share of output drop due to drop in extensive margin in month with worst trade drop
Method 1 Method 2 Method 3 Method 4 Method 5
* For Mexico, to remove the effect of NAFTA in methods 2, 4, and 5 we base the weighting/filtering on the pre-NAFTA period. Also, to 
remove changes in HS-10 codes and transactions from changes in the classification system, we forced the change from December to January 
each year to equal the average change in the previous three months. 
Method 1: no weighting; Method 2: weight by total value of imports 1990-2004; Method 3: weight by total value of imports 1990-
devaluation; Method 4: drop smallest total (1990-2004) value goods that account for lowest 20% import value. No weighting; Method 5: 
weight by total value of imports per good (when computing # goods) and per transaction (when computing # transactions).
B: Average share of output drop due to drop in extensive margin in 3 month window around worst month
Method 1 Method 2 Method 3 Method 4 Method 5